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Abstract
The adversarial model presented by trusted execution environ-
ments (TEEs) has prompted researchers to investigate unusual
attack vectors. One particularly powerful class of controlled-
channel attacks abuses page-table modifications to reliably
track enclave memory accesses at a page-level granularity. In
contrast to noisy microarchitectural timing leakage, this line
of deterministic controlled-channel attacks abuses indispens-
able architectural interfaces and hence cannot be mitigated by
tweaking microarchitectural resources.
We propose an innovative controlled-channel attack, named
COPYCAT, that deterministically counts the number of in-
structions executed within a single enclave code page. We
show that combining the instruction counts harvested by
COPYCAT with traditional, coarse-grained page-level leakage
allows the accurate reconstruction of enclave control flow
at a maximal instruction-level granularity. COPYCAT can
identify intra-page and intra-cache line branch decisions that
ultimately may only differ in a single instruction, underscor-
ing that even extremely subtle control flow deviations can be
deterministically leaked from secure enclaves. We demon-
strate the improved resolution and practicality of COPYCAT
on Intel SGX in an extensive study of single-trace and deter-
ministic attacks against cryptographic implementations, and
give novel algorithmic attacks to perform single-trace key ex-
traction that exploit subtle vulnerabilities in the latest versions
of widely-used cryptographic libraries. Our findings highlight
the importance of stricter verification of cryptographic imple-
mentations, especially in the context of TEEs.
1 Introduction
In the past years, we have seen a continuous stream of
software-based side-channel attacks [3, 7, 24, 28, 46, 82, 83].
A first category of microarchitectural timing attacks com-
monly abuses optimizations in modern processors, where
secret-dependent state is accumulated in various microarchi-
tectural buffers during the victim’s execution. If these buffers
are not flushed before a context switch to an attacker domain,
victim secrets can be reconstructed by observing timing vari-
ations by the attacker. The success of these attacks critically
relies on subtle timing differences, making them inherently
non-deterministic and prone to measurement noise [28]. Usu-
ally, this class of stateful attacks can be eliminated by isolating
leaky microarchitectural resources [23, 45, 66, 79].
Orthogonal to the first class of microarchitectural timing
attacks, recent research on controlled-channel attacks [29,
72, 74, 80] has abused the processor’s privileged software in-
terface to extract fully deterministic, noise-free side-channel
access patterns from enclave applications. While the operat-
ing system (OS) was traditionally not considered to be under
the attacker’s control, this assumption fundamentally changed
with the rise of trusted execution environments (TEEs), such
as Intel SGX. Prior research [72, 80] has identified page-
table accesses and faults as privileged interfaces that can
be exploited as no-noise controlled channels to deterministi-
cally reveal enclave memory accesses at a 4 KiB page-level
granularity. The paging channel has drawn considerable re-
search attention since it abuses an intrinsic property of the x86
processor architecture without relying on microarchitectural
states. In particular, controlled-channel attacks have proven
to be challenging to mitigate in a principled way, in spite of
numerous defense proposals [20, 21, 50, 56, 60, 61, 65].
In this work, we show that the resolution of determinis-
tic controlled-channel attacks extends well beyond the rel-
atively coarse-grained 4 KiB page-level granularity. We in-
troduce COPYCAT, an innovative interrupt-counting chan-
nel that can precisely reconstruct the intra-page control flow
of a secure enclave at a maximal, instruction-level granular-
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ity. Our attack leverages the SGX-Step [70] framework to
forcibly step into a victim enclave code exactly one instruc-
tion at a time. While high-frequency timer interrupts have
previously been leveraged to boost microarchitectural timing
attacks [30, 34, 44, 47, 71], we exploit the architectural in-
terrupt interface itself as a deterministic controlled channel.
In short, our attacks rely on the key observation that merely
counting the number of times a victim enclave can be inter-
rupted directly reveals the number of executed instructions.
We show that combining our fine-grained interrupt-based
counting technique with traditional, coarse-grained page-table
access patterns [72, 74] as a secondary oracle allows us to
construct highly effective and deterministic attacks that track
enclave control flow at a maximal, instruction-level granular-
ity. Crucially, the improved temporal dimension of COPYCAT
overcomes the spatial resolution limitation of prior controlled-
channel attacks, invalidating a key assumption in some prior
defenses [39, 61] that presumes that adversaries can only de-
terministically monitor enclave memory accesses at a coarse-
grained 4 KiB granularity. Furthermore, in contrast to previ-
ous high-resolution SGX side channels [3, 44, 46, 47, 71] that
rely on timing differences from contention in some shared
microarchitectural state, COPYCAT cannot be transparently
mitigated by isolating microarchitectural resources.
To demonstrate the strength of COPYCAT, we develop
single-trace attacks that allow efficient cryptographic key re-
covery from multiple widely-used cryptographic libraries. We
extend the cryptanalysis of the binary Euclidean algorithm,
which is used for modular inversion in most of the common li-
braries we examined, and give novel algorithms for efficiently
recovering cryptographic keys from a single control flow trace
for DSA and ECDSA digital signature generation and RSA
key generation. The libraries we examined implemented nu-
merous mitigations against side-channel attacks, including
always-add-and-double for elliptic curve scalar multiplication
and RSA exponent masking, but these protections were insuf-
ficient to protect against COPYCAT. We conclude that new
classes of defenses will be necessary to protect against this
type of high-granularity, deterministic, and noise-free attack.
Contributions. In summary, our main contributions are:
• We propose COPYCAT: a novel deterministic controlled-
channel attack to leak runtime control flow from Intel SGX
enclaves without noise at an instruction-level granularity.
• We explore the impact of COPYCAT on non-crypto appli-
cations by defeating a state-of-the-art compiler hardening
technique against branch shadowing attacks.
• In an extensive empirical case study of side-channel vulner-
abilities in widely-used cryptographic libraries including
WolfSSL, Libgcrypt, OpenSSL, and Intel IPP, we verify
the practicality and capability of these attacks, demonstrate
several attacks, and report vulnerabilities in some of these
libraries.
• We devise new algorithmic techniques to exploit these
vulnerabilities in DSA, ECDSA, and ElGamal, as well as
RSA key generation, which result in complete key recovery
in the context of Intel SGX.
• Finally, we outline requirements and pitfalls for counter-
measures and mitigations in hardware and software.
Responsible Disclosure. We reported the weaknesses in
WolfSSL in Nov. 2019 and provided guidelines for mitigation,
tracked via CVEs 2019-1996{0,1,3} and CVE-2020-7960.
We reported our findings to OpenSSL and Libgcrypt teams in
Feb. 2020. OpenSSL replaced BN_gcd with a constant-time
implementation [10] in version 1.1.1e. Libgcrypt issued a
similar fix that will appear in version 1.8.6.
We shared our attack with the Intel product security inci-
dent response team (iPSIRT), who acknowledged that COPY-
CAT leaks side-channel information, but re-iterated that pro-
tecting against side channels requires the enclave developer
to follow the constant-time coding best practices as advised
by Intel [41]. Section 7 elaborates further on mitigations and
explains how fully preventing our attacks requires the meticu-
lous application of constant-time programming paradigms.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Side-Channel Attacks on Intel SGX
Recent Intel processors include software guard extensions
(SGX) [40] to allow trusted execution of critical code in so-
called enclaves on top of a potentially compromised OS. SGX
enclaves are isolated at runtime in a memory area that is
transparently encrypted and can be remotely attested by the
processor. Dedicated eenter and eexit instructions switch
the processor in and out of “enclave mode”.
Importantly, while the confidentiality and integrity of en-
claved execution is always safeguarded by the processor, tradi-
tionally privileged OS software remains in charge of availabil-
ity concerns. SGX enclaves live in the virtual address space
of a conventional, user-space process. To allow for demand-
paging and oversubscription of the physically available en-
crypted memory, enclave page-table mappings are verified but
remain under the explicit control of the untrusted OS. Recent
address translations may be cached in an internal translation
lookaside buffer (TLB), which is flushed by the processor on
every enclave transition. When delivering asynchronous inter-
rupts or exceptions, the processor takes care to securely save
and scrub CPU registers before exiting the enclave, which
can be subsequently re-entered through the eresume instruc-
tion. Furthermore, in case of a page-fault event, the processor
clears the lower bits representing the page offset in the re-
ported address to ensure that the OS can only observe enclave
memory accesses at a 4 KiB page-level granularity.
While Intel SGX provides strong architectural isolation,
several studies have highlighted that enclave secrets may still
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Table 1: Characterization of demonstrated Intel SGX microarchitectural side channels (top) and controlled channels (bottom).
Our novel COPYCAT technique is highlighted at the bottom and combines noise-free interrupt counting measurements with
deterministic page table accesses to reconstruct enclave-private control flow at a maximal, instruction-level granularity.
Attack Data Granularity Noise
µ-
ar
ch
co
nt
en
tio
n DRAM row buffer conflicts [74] Code + data 8 Low (1-8 KiB) 8 High
PRIME+PROBE cache conflicts [15, 30, 47, 58] Code + data 8 Med (64-512 B cache line/set) ∼ Med
Read-after-write false dependencies [46] Data 4 High (4 B) 8 High
Branch prediction history buffers [24, 34, 44] Code 4 High (branch instruction) ∼ Low
Interrupt latency [71] Code + data 4 High (instruction latency class) 8 High
Port contention [3] Code 4 High (µ-op execution port) 8 High
C
tr
lc
ha
nn
el Page faults [80] and page table A/D bits [72, 74] Code + data 8 Low (4 KiB ) 4 Deterministic
IA-32 segmentation faults [29] Code + data 8 Low/high (4 KiB; 1 B for enclaves ≤ 1 MiB) 4 Deterministic
Page table FLUSH+RELOAD [72] Code + data 8 Low (32 KiB) ∼ Low
COPYCAT Code 4 High (instruction) 4 Deterministic
leak through side-channel analysis. Table 1 summarizes how
all previously demonstrated side-channel attacks fall into two
categories:1 (i) microarchitectural timing attacks, which may
achieve a high granularity but are inherently prone to mea-
surement noise, and (ii) fully deterministic controlled-chan-
nel attacks that only offer a relatively coarse grained 4 KiB
page-level granularity. COPYCAT proposes the only generally
applicable controlled-channel attack that is both fully deter-
ministic and offers a maximal, instruction-level granularity.
Microarchitectural Contention. Microarchitectural tim-
ing side-channel attacks exploit the fact that various re-
sources, such as caches [15, 30, 47, 58], DRAM row
buffers [74], branch predictors [24, 34, 44], dependency res-
olution logic [46], or execution ports [3] are competitively
shared between sibling CPU threads or not flushed when ex-
iting the enclave. This contention causes measurable timing
differences in the attacker domain, allowing the attacker to
infer the private control flow or data access pattern of the
enclave with varying degrees of granularity. In the context
of a TEE such as Intel SGX, such attacks can be mounted
with less noise and improved resolution because the adversary
controls the OS.
In particular, one line of work has developed interrupt-
driven attacks [30, 44, 47, 70] that rely on frequent enclave
preemption to sample side-channel measurements at an im-
proved temporal resolution. This technique has been demon-
strated to amplify side-channel leakage from the cache [47],
the branch target buffer [44], and the directional branch pre-
dictor [34]. Similar techniques have been applied to attack
ARM TrustZone [54]. Nemesis [71] showed that while sin-
gle stepping, the response time to service an interrupt may
reveal which instruction is being executed in the pipeline.
The SGX-Step framework [70] has been leveraged in several
other microarchitectural attacks [2, 34, 57, 67, 68, 71] to reli-
1 Transient-execution attacks [57, 67, 68] are orthogonal to metadata
leakage through side channels and require recovery of the trusted computing
base through complementary microcode and compiler mitigations.
ably single-step enclaves at a maximal temporal resolution by
means of precise and short timer interrupt intervals.
Controlled-Channel Attacks. Xu et al. [80] first showed
how privileged adversaries can revoke access rights on a spe-
cific enclave page and be deterministically notified by means
of a page-fault signal when the enclave next accesses that page.
They demonstrated several attacks on non-cryptographic ap-
plications by observing that page-fault sequences uniquely
identify specific points in the victim’s execution. Subsequent
work [72, 74] developed stealthier techniques to extract the
same information without provoking page faults. These at-
tacks interrupt the victim enclave to forcefully flush the TLB
and provoke page-table walks, which can later be recon-
structed through “accessed” and “dirty” attributes or cache
timing differences for untrusted page-table entries. Finally,
Gyselinck et al. [29] demonstrated an alternative controlled-
channel attack that abuses legacy IA32 segmentation faults.
Their attack offers an improved, byte-level granularity in the
first MiB of the enclave address space, but only for the un-
usual case of a 32-bit enclave, and this behavior has since
been fixed in recent microcode.
With COPYCAT, we contribute an improved attack tech-
nique to refine the resolution of existing controlled channels
by precisely counting the number of executed enclave in-
structions between successive page accesses. Prior work has
similarly suggested an additional temporal dimension for the
paging channel by using interrupts to reconstruct strlen loop
iterations [69, 70], or by logging noisy wall-clock time [74]
for page-access events to improve stealthiness and reduce the
number of TLB flushes. Recent work [42] on enclave con-
trol flow obfuscation furthermore investigated using single-
stepping in an SGX simulator to probabilistically identify
software versions in an emulated enclave debug environment.
In contrast to these specialized cases, COPYCAT explicitly
recognizes instruction counting as a practical and generically
applicable attack primitive that can deterministically capture
the execution trace within a single enclave code page.
3
2.2 Cryptographic Signature Schemes
Signature schemes are extensively used for remote attestation
and authentication of trusted enclaves such as Intel SGX [39].
Moreover, TEEs like Intel SGX can promise trusted execu-
tion of these algorithms for a wide range of applications such
as trusted key management [25] and private contact discov-
ery [62]. In this section, we provide an overview of signing
algorithms based on public-key cryptography (PKC) that are
used in our attack demonstrations.
RSA. RSA keys [53] are generated as follows:
1. Choose large prime numbers p and q, compute N = pq,
2. Compute the least common multiple λ(N) =
lcm(p-1,q-1),
3. Choose e such that 1 < e < λ(N) and gcd(e,λ(N)) = 1,
4. Compute d = e−1 mod λ(N).
(N,e) are public and (p,q,λ(N),d) are private. RSA imple-
mentations commonly use the Chinese remainder theorem
(CRT) to reduce computation time, and generate additional
private values dP = d mod (p−1), dQ = d mod (q−1), and
qinv = q−1 mod p. A signature is the value s = hd mod N
where h is a hashed and padded message. Signature verifi-
cation checks if h ≡ se mod N. To prevent side-channel at-
tacks on signature generation, most implementations blind
the input h with a random r before computing the modular
exponentiation: sb = (hre)d mod N = hdr mod N. Later, the
unblinded signature can be computed as s = sbr−1 mod N.
As a result, attacks on RSA key generation have gained recent
attention [2, 5]. However, since the private key parameters are
only computed once, an attack against RSA key generation
must only require a single trace.
DSA and ElGamal. In the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) [26], the public parameters are a prime p, another
prime divisor n of p− 1, and the group generator g. The
private key x is chosen randomly such that 1< x< n−1, and
the public key is y = gx(mod p). To sign a message hash h:
1. Choose a random secret k such that 1 < k < n−1,
2. Compute r = gk mod p mod n,
3. Compute s = k−1(h+ r · x) mod n.
(r,s) is the output signature pair.
In the ElGamal signature scheme, an alternative to DSA,
the first signature pair r is computed similarly, but the second
pair is computed as s = k−1(h− r · x) mod (p−1).
ECDSA. Elliptic-curve DSA (ECDSA) is similar to DSA.
The public parameters are an elliptic curve E with scalar
multiplication operation ×, a point G on the curve, and the
integer order n of G over E. The secret key d is a random
integer satisfying 1 < d < n− 1, and the public key is Q =
d×G. Signature generation for a message hash h is as follows:
1. Choose a random secret k such that 1 < k < n−1,
2. Compute (x,y) = k×G and r = x mod n,
3. Compute s = k−1(h+ r ·d) mod n.
(r,s) is the output signature pair.
In DSA, ECDSA and ElGamal, it is critical for k to be
uniquely chosen for each signature generation and to remain
secret. Exposing one instance of k for a known signature re-
sults in a simple key recovery: d = r−1(s ·k−h) mod n. Since
k is an ephemeral value, a noisy side-channel attack against
k cannot reduce the sampling noise using multiple runs of
the attack. However, as discussed in Section 2.3, lattice at-
tacks can recover the signing key from partial knowledge of
k for many signatures. In Section 4.2 and Section 5, we show
that we can recover the entire ephemeral k deterministically
in a single trace of the computation of the modular inverse
k−1 mod n. Single-trace attacks on signature generation il-
lustrate vulnerabilities even in scenarios where an attacker
cannot trigger multiple signature generation operations or can
only collect a single trace.
2.3 Side-Channel Attacks on PKC Schemes
Public-key algorithms that execute variable operations for
each bit of a secret input, like the square-and-multiply algo-
rithm for modular exponentiation, and scalar multiplication
based on Montgomery ladders, are susceptible to side-channel
leakage. Such algorithms have been exploited in naive at-
tacks [81, 82, 84] where the victim is triggered many times to
compensate for potential sampling noise. These attacks gen-
erally conclude with the recovery of most of the secret bits.
Nowadays, most implementations have adopted constant-time
algorithms like fixed-window scalar multiplication to mitigate
such attacks [52].
Key Recovery using Partial Information. Key recovery
from DSA and ECDSA with partial knowledge of the nonce k
can be solved efficiently using lattices [13, 49]. These attacks
apply to the case when a few bits are leaked about the nonce
for multiple signatures, and the adversary can sample many
signatures. Researchers have applied lattice-based attacks
to non-constant time algorithms that leak some information
about k [8, 51, 55]. Garcia et al. [27] demonstrate an attack
that recovers the sequence of divisions and subtractions from
the binary extended Euclidean algorithm (BEEA) for modular
inversion. They observe that this sequence leaks some least
significant bits of k and apply a lattice-based key recovery
algorithm. In contrast, COPYCAT allows full key recovery
from a single DSA signature trace, even for a compact BEEA
implementation (§4.2). We generalize this attack to another
vulnerable modular inverse implementation used for DSA,
ECDSA, and ElGamal (§5).
Even subtle implementation flaws that leak the bit length
of k are sufficient for multi-trace lattice-based key recov-
ery [16, 22, 48]. In these cases, while the algorithm was
implemented with enough care to avoid secret-dependent con-
ditional statements, they leak the bit length by skipping the
most significant zero bits of k. In Section 4.4, we exploit a
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countermeasure against this attack to precisely leak the nonce
length, and recover the secret key using a lattice attack.
Single-Trace Attacks on RSA. Recent work has demon-
strated a single-trace side-channel attack against RSA key
generation that leaks the sequence of divisions and subtrac-
tions from the BEEA during the coprimality test gcd(e, p−
1) [4, 75] or secret key generation d = e−1 mod λ(N) [18].
These attacks recover the secrets (p−1) or lcm(p−1,q−1)
from this sequence when e is small enough to be brute forced,
which is typically the case in practice2. The proposed mitiga-
tion is to increase the size of the input e by masking it with a
random variable that may be hard coded [18]. In Section 4.3,
we use COPYCAT to recover all the branches from BEEA, not
just the sequence of divisions and subtractions. We propose
a novel algorithm that uses this information to recover the
private factors p and q from e−1 mod λ(N). Our attack works
even for large e, thwarting the above mitigations.
Furthermore, our algorithm is even able to recover the key
from a modular inversion algorithm with multiple unknowns.
We demonstrate a novel end-to-end single-trace attack on the
CRT computation q−1 mod p. In a concurrent and indepen-
dent work, Aldaya et al. [2] outline a different key recov-
ery algorithm for q−1 mod p that is not always successful.
Our single-trace attacks on RSA in Section 4.3 use a branch-
and-prune algorithm inspired by Heninger and Shacham [31].
Bernstein et al. applied a variant of branch-and-prune al-
gorithm to recover RSA keys from a sliding-window mod-
ular exponentiation implementation [9]. Similarly, Yarom
et al. demonstrated an attack with intra-cache line granularity
on a fixed-window implementation of modular exponentia-
tion that recovers a fraction of the bits [83]. In Section 5,
we generalize our attack to implementations of BEEA used
in other popular cryptographic libraries. We demonstrate at-
tacks against gcd(p−1,q−1) in OpenSSL X.931 RSA and
q−1 mod p and e−1 mod λ(N) in WolfSSL and Libgcrypt.
3 COPYCAT Attack
Attacker Model. We assume the standard Intel SGX root
adversary model with full control over the untrusted OS [40].
SGX’s strong threat model is justified, for instance, by con-
sidering untrusted cloud providers under the jurisdiction of
foreign nation states, or end users with an incentive to break
DRM technology running on their own device. Following
prior work, we assume a remote, software-only adversary
who has compromised the untrusted OS, allowing the x86
APIC timer device to be configured to precisely interrupt the
enclave [30, 44, 47, 70] and modify page-table entries to learn
enclaved memory accessed at a 4 KiB granularity [61, 72, 80].
Like previous attacks, we further assume knowledge of the
victim application, either through source code or the applica-
tion binary. We assume the enclave code is free from memory-
2e is commonly chosen as 216 +1 = 65537.
safety vulnerabilities [69] and the Intel SGX platform is prop-
erly updated against transient-execution attacks [57, 67].
The adversary’s goal is to learn fine-grained control-flow
decisions in the victim enclave. In contrast to noisy microar-
chitectural side channels [3, 15, 44, 46, 47, 71], we can also
target victims who process a secret only once in a single
run (as is the case in key generation) and hence victims who
cannot be forced to repeatedly perform computations on the
same secret multiple times. Crucially, in contrast to prior
controlled-channel attacks [72, 80], COPYCAT offers intra-
page granularity and we assume that conditional control flow
blocks in the victim enclave are aligned “to exist entirely
within a single page” as officially recommended by Intel [39].
3.1 Building the Interrupt Primitive
Debug features like the x86 single-step trap flag are explicitly
disabled by the Intel SGX design [40] while in enclave mode.
Recent research, however, has demonstrated that root adver-
saries may abuse APIC timer interrupts to forcibly pause a
victim enclave at fixed time intervals. We build our interrupt
primitive on top of the open-source SGX-Step [70] frame-
work, which offers a maximal temporal resolution by reliably
interrupting the victim enclave at most one instruction at a
time. SGX-Step comes in the form of a Linux kernel driver
and runtime library to configure APIC timer interrupts and
untrusted page-table entries directly from user space.
Deterministic Single-Stepping. We first estab-
lish a suitable value for the platform-specific
SGX_STEP_TIMER_INTERVAL parameter using the SGX-Step
benchmark tool on our target processor. This ensures that the
victim enclave always executes at most one instruction at
a time. Previous studies [34, 70, 71] have reported reliable
single-stepping results with SGX-Step for enclaves with
several hundred thousand instructions where in the vast
majority of cases (> 97%) the timer interrupt arrives within
the first enclave instruction after eresume, i.e., single-step,
and in all other cases the interrupt arrives within eresume
itself, i.e., zero-step before an enclave instruction is ever
executed. Furthermore, zero-step events can be filtered out by
observing that the “accessed” bit in the untrusted page-table
entry mapping the enclave code page is only ever set by
the processor when the interrupt arrived after eresume and
the enclave instruction has indeed been retired [71]. Hence,
to achieve noiseless and deterministic single-stepping for
revealing code and data accesses at an instruction-level
granularity, we rely on the observation that a properly
configured timer never causes a multi-step, and we discard
any zero-step events by querying the “accessed” bit in the
untrusted page-table entry mapping the current enclave code
page. The experimental evaluation in Section 4 confirms that
our single-stepping interrupt primitive indeed behaves fully
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deterministically when using COPYCAT to count several
millions of enclave instructions.
Before entering single-stepping mode, we first use a coarse-
grained page-fault state machine to easily advance the en-
claved execution to a specific function invocation on the tar-
geted code page. Such page-fault sequences have priorly been
shown to uniquely locate specific execution points in large
binaries [61, 75, 80]. Once the specific code page of inter-
est has been located, COPYCAT starts counting instructions
until detecting the next code or data page access to reveal
instruction-level control flow.
Effects of Macro Fusion. Interestingly, we found that
COPYCAT can also be used to study a microarchitectural
optimization in recent Intel Core processors, referred to as
macro fusion [38, 77]. The idea behind this optimization tech-
nique is to combine certain adjacent instruction pairs in the
front-end into a single micro-op that executes with a single
dispatch and hence frees up space in the processor pipeline.
Intel documents that fusion only takes place for some well-
defined compare-and-branch instruction pairs [38, §3.4.2.2],
which are additionally not split on a cache line boundary [38,
§2.4.2.1]. We experimentally found that for fusible instruc-
tion pairs, COPYCAT consistently counts only one interrupt,
even though the enclave-private program counter has been
advanced with two assembly instructions forming the fused
pair. Our experimental observations on Kaby Lake confirm
Intel’s documented limitations, e.g., test;jo can be fused
(interrupted once) but not cmp;jo (interrupted twice); and
fusible pairs that are split across an exact cache line boundary
are not fused (interrupted twice). Importantly, we found that
macro fusion does not impact the reliability of COPYCAT
as a deterministic attack primitive. That is, we consistently
observed in all of our attacks that macro fusion depends solely
on the architectural program state, i.e., opcode types and their
alignments, and hence a given code path always results in the
same, deterministic number of interrupts.
To the best of our knowledge, COPYCAT contributes the
first methodology to independently research and reverse-
engineer macro fusion optimizations in Intel processors.
While our observations confirm that macro fusion behaves
as specified, we consider a precise understanding of macro
fusion of particular importance for compile-time hardening
techniques that balance conditional code paths (§7).
3.2 Instruction-Level Page Access Traces
Leakage Model. COPYCAT complements the coarse-
grained 4 KiB spatial resolution of previous page fault-driven
attacks with a fully deterministic temporal dimension. By
interrupting after every instruction and querying page-table
“accessed” bits, COPYCAT adversaries obtain an instruction-
granular trace of page visits performed by the enclave. This
trace may reveal private branch decisions whenever a secret-
dependent execution path does not access the exact same set
if (c == 0){ r = add(r, d); } else { r = add(r, s); }
test %eax,%eax
je 1f
mov %edx,%esi
1:
call add
mov %eax,-0xc(%rbp)
test/je call
Code P0
Stack S
Code P1c = 0
test/je mov call
Code P0
Stack S
Code P1c = 1
Figure 1: Balanced if/else statement (top), compiled to as-
sembly (left). Precise page-aligned, intra-cache line condi-
tional control flow can be deterministically reconstructed with
instruction-granular COPYCAT page access traces (right).
of code and data pages at every instruction offset in both
branches. Importantly, even when both execution paths access
the same sequence of code and data pages, and hence remain
indistinguishable for a traditional page-fault adversary [80],
we show below that compilers may in practice still emit un-
balanced instruction counts between page accesses in both
branches. Sections 6 and 7 elaborate further on the limitations
of this leakage model and the precise requirements for static
code balancing solutions.
If/Else Statement. Conditional branches are pervasive in
all applications [30, 32, 44, 80], but even side-channel
hardened cryptographic software may assume that carefully
aligned if/else statements or tight loops cannot be reliably
reconstructed (§4). Figure 1 provides a minimal example of
an if statement that has been hardened using a balancing else
branch, e.g., as in the Montgomery Ladder algorithm. The
corresponding assembly code, as compiled by gcc, indeed
only differs in a single x86 instruction that can fit entirely
within the same page and cache line. This if branch is hence
indistinguishable for a page-fault or cache adversary. While
finer-grained, branch prediction side channels may still be
able to reconstruct the branch outcome, these attacks typi-
cally require several runs of the victim and can be trivially
addressed by flushing the branch predictor on an enclave exit.
Figure 1 illustrates how COPYCAT can deterministically
reconstruct the branch outcome merely by counting the num-
ber of instructions executed on the P0 code page containing
the if branch before control flow is eventually transferred to
the P1 code page containing the add function, as revealed by
probing the “accessed” bit in the corresponding page-table
entry. The example furthermore highlights that even if all of
the code were to fit on a single code page P0 = P1, COPYCAT
adversaries could still distinguish both branches by compar-
ing the relative position of the data access to the stack page S
performed by the call instruction. In particular, while tradi-
tional page-fault adversaries always see the same page fault
sequence (P0,S,P1), independent of the secret, COPYCAT
enriches this information with precise instruction counts, re-
6
switch(c)
{
case 0:
r = 0xbeef;
break;
case 1:
r = 0xcafe;
break;
default:
r = 0;
}
test/je mov jmp
Code
Data
Case 0
test/je cmp/je mov jmp
Code
Data
Case 1
test/je cmp/je jmp mov
Code
Data
Default
Figure 2: Conditional data assignments in a page-aligned
switch statement (left) deterministically leak through their
relative positions in the precise, instruction-granular page
access traces extracted by COPYCAT (right).
sulting in distinguishable instruction-level page access traces
(P0,P0,S,P1) vs. (P0,P0,P0,S,P1).
Switch-Case Statement. As a further example, Figure 2
illustrates precise control-flow recovery in a switch-case state-
ment, where the code blocks again fall entirely within a single
page and cache line, and where the same data is accessed in
every case. While traditional page-fault adversaries always
observe an identical, input-independent access sequence to
the code and data pages, and the tight sequence of conditional
jumps poses a considerable challenge for branch prediction ad-
versaries [44], COPYCAT deterministically reveals the entire
control flow through the relative position of the data access
in the instruction-granular page access traces.
3.3 Defeating Branch Shadowing Defenses
To highlight the importance of COPYCAT for non-
cryptographic applications, we employ its improved resolu-
tion to defeat a state-of-the-art compiler defense [32] against
branch predictor leakage. This again shows that COPYCAT
changes the attack landscape and requires orthogonal mitiga-
tions when compared to microarchitectural side channels.
Branch Shadowing Mitigation. Lee et al. [44] first pro-
posed Zigzagger, an automated compile-time approach to
defend against branch-shadowing attacks by rewriting condi-
tional branches using cmov and a tight trampoline sequence
of unconditional jump instructions. However, the security of
their compiler transformation critically relies on the trampo-
line sequences being non-interruptible, and several proof-of-
concept attacks on Zigzagger have been demonstrated using
precise interrupt capabilities [29, 70, 71]. In response, Hos-
seinzadeh et al. [32] designed an improved compiler miti-
gation that employs runtime randomization to dynamically
shuffle jump blocks on the trampoline area, thereby effec-
tively hiding branch targets and making branch shadowing
attacks probabilistically infeasible. Figure 3 illustrates how
CMOVE JMP
JMP MOV
JMP
JMPNOP JMP ...
NOPMOV ADD
NOP NOP
NOP
if block else block
1 2
3 1
Figure 3: Compiler mitigation [32] for branch prediction side
channels. COPYCAT reveals control flow via the number of
instructions executed on the trampoline page (red, dashed).
conditional branches are redirected through randomized jump
locations 1© on the trampoline page, while ensuring that all
jumps 2© outside of the trampoline are always executed in the
same order. Finally, to protect against timing attacks, trampo-
line code is explicitly balanced with dummy instructions 3©
to compensate for skipped blocks in the instrumented code.
Case-Study Attack. We evaluated COPYCAT on the open-
source3 release of the compiler hardening scheme [32] based
on LLVM 6.0. First, we found that the dummy instruction bal-
ancing pass is not always entirely accurate and may result in
execution paths that differ slightly by one or two instructions
(cf. Appendix A.2). Crucially, while such subtle deviations
would indeed very likely not be exploitable through timing, as
originally envisioned by the mitigation, we experimentally val-
idated that the unbalanced paths can be fully deterministically
distinguished by COPYCAT adversaries. Second, even when
the code paths are perfectly balanced, Figure 3 illustrates that
merely counting the number of instructions executed on the
trampoline page deterministically reveals whether the victim
is executing balancing dummy code in a trampoline block
or the actual if block on the instrumented code page. Note
that the compiler carefully maintains a constant jump order
when moving back and forth between the trampoline area and
the instrumented code, ensuring that the execution remains
oblivious to classical page-fault adversaries [61, 80] who will
always observe the exact same sequence of pages regardless
of the actual code blocks being executed.
4 Unleashing COPYCAT on WolfSSL
WolfSSL is a prominent, FIPS-certified solution officially
supporting Intel SGX [78]. In a case study on the WolfSSL
cryptographic library, we show that COPYCAT enables attacks
that were not previously possible without a deterministic and
fine-grained leakage model. In Section 4.1, we outline our
controlled-channel attack using COPYCAT to precisely re-
cover the full execution trace of WolfSSL’s implementation
of the binary extended Euclidean algorithm (BEEA), which is
used for modular inversion of cryptographic secrets in DSA,
ECDSA, and RSA. Precise recovery of the full execution flow
of BEEA enables new single-trace algorithmic attacks on both
3Branch shadowing mitigation: https://github.com/SSGAalto/
sgx-branch-shadowing-mitigation
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DSA signing and RSA key generation, as demonstrated in Sec-
tions 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Finally, we apply COPYCAT to
bypass incomplete side-channel mitigations and recover de-
terministic partial information on ECDSA signatures, which
allows for efficient key recovery via lattices.
Experimental Setup. Our experimental setup includes a
desktop Intel Core i7-7700 CPU that supports Intel SGX
and is updated with the latest microcode (0xca) running
Ubuntu 16.04 with kernel 4.14.0-72-generic. We use the SGX-
Step [70] framework v1.4.0 to implement our attacks on the
latest stable WolfSSL version 4.2.0. WolfSSL officially sup-
ports compilation for Intel SGX enclaves. We implemented
our key recovery attacks in SageMath version 8.8.
4.1 COPYCAT on BEEA
Computing the modular inverse or greatest common divi-
sor (GCD) using the binary extended Euclidean algorithm
(BEEA) has previously exposed cryptographic implementa-
tions to side-channel attacks [1, 27, 75]. The BEEA, as shown
in Algorithm 1, is not constant time and can leak various bits
of its input. However, previous attacks are limited to recover-
ing only partial and noisy information about the secret input.
This limitation stems from low spatial resolution and the pres-
ence of noise. For instance, a cache- or page-level attacker
who can distinguish which arithmetic subroutines have been
invoked cannot determine the outcome of the comparison at
line 13 since both directions of the branch generate exactly
the same sequence of memory access patterns. In addition,
the arithmetic functions may fit within the same page and
become indistinguishable for a page-level adversary. Alterna-
tively, a cache attacker may try to track the outcome of these
branches within the same page by tracking the corresponding
instruction cache lines for the BEEA subroutine. However,
a compact implementation of this algorithm can fit multiple
branches within the same cache line. While some microarchi-
tectural attacks on the instruction stream may leak some of
these low-level branch outcomes, they are all prone to various
amounts of noise [3, 24, 34, 44, 71].
WolfSSL supports two different BEEA implementations
in subroutines fp_invmod_slow and fp_invmod.4 The for-
mer is a straightforward implementation, and the latter is a
compact implementation that only supports odd moduli. We
analyze both implementations and show how to use COPYCAT
to recover the runtime control flow of these implementations
deterministically and without noise.
Binary Layout of Modular Inversion. After compilation,
the subroutines fp_iseven and fp_isodd are simply in-
lined within the same page as their caller fp_invmod_slow.
4 fp_invmod_slow and fp_invmod can be found at line 885 and
1015 of https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/blob/48c4b2fedc/
wolfcrypt/src/tfm.c, respectively.
Algorithm 1 Modular inversion using the BEEA. In the op-
timized compact implementation when the modulus is odd,
highlighted (blue) statements are removed.
1: procedure MODINV(u, modulus v)
2: bi← 0 di← 1,ui← u,vi = v, ai← 1, ci← 0
3: while isEven(ui) do
4: ui← ui/2
5: if isOdd(bi) then
6: bi← bi−u, ai← ai + v
7: bi← bi/2, ai← ai/2
8: while isEven(vi) do
9: vi← vi/2
10: if isOdd(di) then
11: di← di−u, ci← ci + v
12: di← di/2, ci← ci/2
13: if ui > vi then
14: ui← ui− vi, bi← bi−di, ai← ai− ci
15: else
16: vi← vi−ui, di← di−bi, ci← ci−ai
17:
return di
However, the arithmetic functions A=fp_add, C=fp_cmp,
D=fp_div_2, and S=fp_sub are external calls and reside
in a new page. Analyzing these arithmetic functions (A, C, D,
S), including their internal subroutines, shows that they span
2,895 bytes. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that they can fit
into a single 4 KiB page, thus preventing a page-level attacker
from distinguishing them at runtime altogether. In addition,
even assuming they do not align within the same page, recon-
structing the exact execution flow is still impossible. For ex-
ample, the transition from S to D can result from multiple dif-
ferent code paths. The instructions for fp_invmod_slow can
fit into fewer than 6 cache lines with multiple basic blocks5
overlapping within the same line.
WolfSSL also supports a modified version of BEEA,
fp_invmod specialized to the case of odd modulus, which is
used for RSA q−1 mod p (§4.3) and DSA k−1 mod n (§4.2).
The control flow and overall layout for fp_invmod are similar
to the above implementation but it is more compact, as some
of the arithmetic statements have been removed. fp_invmod
can fit into fewer than 4 cache lines with multiple overlapping
basic blocks.
Recovering BEEA Control-Flow Transfers. We ana-
lyzed the runtime control flow of fp_invmod_slow by match-
ing its disassembly with the execution trace we recovered
from running COPYCAT. Figure 4 shows the control flow
transfers at page-level granularity for the page correspond-
ing to fp_invmod_slow and the page corresponding to arith-
metic functions (Circles). Additionally, the weight of each
arrow shows the number of instructions that are executed for
fp_invmod_slow before accessing the page corresponding
to arithmetic functions. The division loop for ui (u-loop) and
vi (v-loop) have a similar control flow. In addition, the two
5A basic block is a code sequence that has no branches in and out.
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Figure 4: Control flow of the BEEA as implemented
by fp_invmod_slow. Each circle (D=div, C=cmp, S=sub,
A=add) represents a call to a function in the page that holds
these arithmetic functions. We count the exact number of in-
structions between two consecutive invocations that hit this
page. The instruction counts reveal branch outcomes.
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Figure 5: An example cut of a trace that is recovered from
fp_invmod_slow. First, the weights are replaced according
to Rules 1, 2, and 3. Then other transitions (Rules 4 and 5)
are used to recover the whole control flow sequence.
blocks of substitutions after the comparison of u > v have
similar control flow for both the left S1 and right S2 direction.
Only certain transitions are viable from these blocks to di-
vision loops during the computation of the modular inverse.
For example, S2 always goes to v-loop and S1 always goes
to u-loop. Since these instruction counts are distinguishable
for transitions that are related to conditional statements, we
can use a trace consisting of a vector of these weights in the
graph to infer the outcome of the conditional statement.
With a trace including the weights of instruction counts
collected between two consecutive accesses to the page that
holds the arithmetic operations (A, C, D, S), we apply a set of
divide-and-conquer rules to reconstruct the control flow for
fp_invmod_slow. These rules start by translating the recov-
ered weights to corresponding generic blocks. For example,
every time the algorithm executes an iteration of a division
loop (u/v-loop), we observe either the sequence D→ D→ D,
or the sequence D→ A→ S→ D→ D. Each of these se-
quences generates a consistent set of weights. Similarly, S1 or
S2 always generates a sequence like C→ S→ S→ S. After
translating these generic blocks, we can use the remaining
transitions to distinguish the exact blocks, i.e., we can recover
whether a S1 or S2 followed by a set of division loops is equal
to a transition from S1 to u-loop or transition from S2 to
v-loop. These rules are summarized as follow:
S2
u-loop
S1
8
v-loop
4S
5
5
C
S
4S
13
S
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8
D
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8
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8
11D
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7
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DStart
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Start
Figure 6: Control flow of BEEA in fp_invmod.
• Rule 1: ? 11−→? 3−→? = D→ D→ D.
• Rule 2: ? 13−→? 4−→? 3−→? 3−→? = D→ A→ S→ D→ D.
• Rule 3: ? 5−→? 4−→? 4−→? =C→ S→ S→ S.
• Rule 4: S? 13−→? = S2→ v-loop.
• Rule 5: S? 8−→? = S1→ u-loop.
We first replace some of the weights according to Rules
1, 2, and 3, which identify if we are in a division loop (u-
loop or v-loop) or a comparison and substitution block (S?).
Then based on the other transitions (Rule 4 and 5), we can
determine which state of the comparison and substitution
block we have moved from, and which division loop we have
moved to within the trace. An example sequence from the
execution of fp_invmod_slow and its translation to the control
flow transitions is given in Figure 5.
For the compact implementation in fp_invmod, we apply
the same approach. Figure 6 shows the control flow for this
implementation after runtime analysis using COPYCAT. Sim-
ilarly, we define a set of rules to translate the trace of in-
struction counts to control flow transfers of BEEA. Based on
Figure 6, we modify the first three rules as follows to support
control-flow recovery based on the same approach:6
• Rule 1: ? 7−→? = D→ D.
• Rule 2: ? 8−→? 3−→? 3−→? = D→ S→ D.
• Rule 3: ? 5−→? 4−→? =C→ S→ S.
4.2 Single-Trace Attack on DSA Signing
In contrast to previous attacks on BEEA that leak partial in-
formation about the nonce [27], COPYCAT recovers virtually
the entire control flow from the execution of this implementa-
tion with 100 percent precision. As a result, we can perform a
single-trace attack on the DSA signing operation. In Section 5,
we generalize this attack and expose multiple vulnerabilities
in the Libgcrypt library.
DSAKey Recovery. WolfSSL uses fp_invmod to compute
the modular inversion of kinv = k−1 mod n, where n is an
odd prime. Since we can recover the exact control flow of
6Rule 4 and 5 remain the same.
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this computation and the modulus n is public, we simply
step through the execution trace of Algorithm 1, applying
each step of the computation according to the recovered trace
to compute kinv bit by bit. After recovering kinv, recovering
the full nonce and private key is trivial: k = k−1inv mod n, x =
r−1(sk−h) mod n.
Evaluation. To attack 160-bit DSA, we used a combination
of pages in a page-level controlled-channel attack to first reach
the beginning of the modular inversion operation for DSA.
Then we start COPYCAT over the code page for fp_invmod.
We executed this attack for 100 different signing operations.
On average, this attack issues 22,000 IRQs and takes 75 ms
to iterate over an average of 6,320 steps for each signature
generation. Out of 100 experiments, our single-trace attack
successfully recovered the full control flow and the key using
the algorithm above, implying that COPYCAT reliably recon-
structs the entire execution flow. As a result, a single-trace
attack on DSA can be executed without the need for multiple
signatures.
4.3 Single-Trace Attacks on RSA KeyGen
During RSA key generation, WolfSSL checks if a potential
prime p is coprime with e by checking if gcd(e, p− 1) is
equal to 1. This step uses the textbook greatest common di-
visor (GCD) algorithm, which simply performs a series of
divisions. This algorithm appears to be less vulnerable to
control-flow-based key recovery. However, in a later stage,
WolfSSL computes d = e−1 mod λ(N) and the CRT parame-
ter q−1 mod p using the BEEA. WolfSSL always generates
the CRT parameters during RSA key generation.7
Key Recovery from a q−1 mod p Trace. Compared to
k−1 mod n, this attack is more challenging since in this case,
both operands p and q are unknown. We give a novel and
efficient attack that recovers the private RSA parameters p
and q using COPYCAT. We use the relationship of the public
modulus N = pq and the execution trace of the BEEA on
q−1 mod p, which provides enough information to recover
the factorization of N. The main idea is that the BEEA al-
gorithm works sequentially from the least significant bits of
p and q. Thus if we iteratively guess bits of p and q start-
ing from the least significant bits, we can verify that a guess
matches the relevant steps of the BEEA execution trace, as
well as the constraint that N = pq for the bits guessed so far,
and eliminate guesses that do not. This algorithm resembles
the branch-and-prune algorithm of [31], with new constraints.
We propose Algorithm 2 to recover p and q using only
knowledge of N and the execution trace of the BEEA on
q−1 mod p. The algorithm starts by initializing a list of hy-
potheses for values of the least significant bits of q and p. Each
7 wc_MakeRsaKey at https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/blob/
48c4b2fedc/wolfcrypt/src/rsa.c#L3726 invokes BEEA multiple times
during RSA Key generation.
Algorithm 2 Recovering p and q from trace of q−1 mod p.
1: procedure RECOVER_PQ(trace t, modulus N)
2: h← (−test_t(t,1,1),1,1,1)
3: while h do
4: steps,b, p,q← hpop(h)
5: if p.q = N then return p,q
6: g← (p,q),(p+2b,q),(p,q+2b),(p+2b,q+2b)
7: for ps,qs in g do
8: if mod(ps.qs,2b+1) = mod(N,2b+1) then
9: hpush(h,(−test_t(trace, ps,qs),b+1, ps,qs))
hypothesis keeps track of the current step, bit position b, and
the hypothesized values of ps = p mod 2b and qs = q mod 2b.
Among the four possible assignments for the (b+ 1)st bits
of p and q in Step 7, there will be two choices satisfying the
constraint that pq≡ N mod 2b+1. For these new guesses, we
evaluate the BEEA algorithm up to the number of bits guessed
so far, and check this deterministic algorithm evaluation on
the guess against the ground truth execution trace t. We then
do a depth-first search prioritized by the number of steps in
which the algorithm executed correctly, and terminate when
we have found a candidate for which pq = N holds.
Evaluation. We executed an attack similar to Section 4.2
to collect traces from the modular inversion of q−1 mod p, as
it is computed by fp_invmod_slow. We tried this attack on
100 different 2048-bit RSA key generations. On average, we
iterate over 39,400 steps by issuing 106490 IRQs in 365 ms.
However, the average time to collect a trace can take up to a
second depending on how fast the prime numbers are chosen.
The attack takes 20 seconds to recover the key from a trace.
All 100 trials of the attack successfully recovered the keys.
Key Recovery from an e−1 mod λ(N) Trace. In contrast
to previous attacks on this computation [18], we propose a
different algorithmic attack that takes advantage of the fact
that COPYCAT can recover the entire control flow of this
algorithm. As a result, a single-trace attack can be carried out
for any value of e, both large or small. This shows that the
proposed masking countermeasure in [18] is insecure against
our strong COPYCAT adversary.
Our goal is to recover the RSA primes p and q using the
trace of the BEEA for d = e−1 mod λ(N). The modulus N
and the public exponent e are known, while λ(N) is secret.
We present a modified branch-and-prune technique in Algo-
rithm 3 that recovers the factors p and q for a large fraction
of generated RSA keys.
The main idea is to iteratively guess bits of p and q starting
from the least significant bits, then verify that pq = N and the
relevant steps of the BEEA execution trace match the guess
so far. However, the BEEA is computed on e and λ(N) =
(p− 1)(q− 1)/gcd(p− 1,q− 1). We do not know gcd(p−
1,q−1) and must guess it for this algorithm, but with high
probability it only has small factors and can be brute forced.
For simplicity, we specialize to the case of gcd(p−1,q−1) =
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Algorithm 3 Recovering p and q from trace of e−1 mod λ.
1: procedure RECOVER_PQ(trace t, e, modulus N)
2: h← (−test_t(t,0,e),1,1,1)
3: while h do
4: steps,b, p,q← hpop(h)
5: if p.q = N then return p,q
6: g← (p,q),(p+2b,q),(p,q+2b),(p+2b,q+2b)
7: for ps,qs in g do
8: if mod(ps.qs,2b+1) = mod(N,2b+1) then
9: φ= (ps−1)(qs−1)
10: for i = 1, . . . ,2` do
11: if psqs > N or mod(φ,2i) 6= 0 then
12: continue
13: λ= φ/2i
14: newsteps = test_t_lamda(t,λ,e)
15: if newsteps >= b+1 then:
16: hpush(h,(−newsteps,b+1, ps,qs))
return fail
2i for small integer i below, but the analysis can be extended
to other candidate small primes with more brute force effort.
For each guess 2i for gcd(p−1,q−1), we iteratively gen-
erate guesses for ps and qs, compute φs = (ps− 1)(qs− 1)
and then λs = φs/2i. We compare the execution trace t to the
execution trace for λs and e. The algorithm either returns p
and q or it fails to recover p and q if φ/λ(N) 6= 2i.
Analysis. The algorithm will succeed whenever φ/λ = 2i
for small i. For non-powers of 2 the test against the BEEA
execution trace in Step 15 will likely fail, and cause this
branch to be pruned. Since p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1
for some p′,q′ ∈ Z, we have λ(N) = lcm(p− 1,q− 1) =
2lcm(p′,q′). From the prime number theorem [59], the prob-
ability that two random integers are coprime converges to
∏p∈primes(1−1/p2) = 6pi2 ≈ 61% as the size of the integers
increases. In other words, if we run Algorithm 3 for only i = 1,
it will succeed 61% of the time when p′ and q′ are actually
coprime. If we allow p′ and q′ to have even factors we obtain
a probability of ∏p∈primes,p>2(1−1/p2) = 8pi2 ≈ 81%. This
means that even for a modest number of iterations, e.g. `= 8,
we have nearly 81% success probability. These estimates are
confirmed by our experiments.
Evaluation. We tried this attack on 100 different key gen-
eration efforts (2048-bit key). On average, we iterate over
81,090 steps by issuing 230,050 interrupts per attack in 800ms.
The average time to collect a trace is about a second and
the attack takes about 30 seconds to successfully recover
the key for 81% of the keys when lcm((p− 1)(q− 1)) ≡
(p−1)(q−1)/2i.
Revisiting Masking Protection. Earlier attacks required
brute forcing over e [75]. Our algorithm works for arbitrary,
even full length e. Thus increasing the size of e by choos-
ing a bigger public exponent or masking is not sufficient to
mitigate our attack. Aldaya et al. [5] proposed masking e by
computing b = (er)−1 mod λ(N) for a random r such that
1 int wc_ecc_mulmod_ex(mp_int∗ k, ecc_point ∗G, ecc_point ∗R, mp_int∗ a, mp_int
∗ modulus, int map, void∗ heap) { ...
2 for (;;) {
3 if (−−bitcnt == 0) { /∗ grab next digit as required ∗/
4 if (digidx == −1) {
5 break;
6 }
7 buf = get_digit(k, digidx);
8 bitcnt = (int)DIGIT_BIT;
9 −−digidx;
10 }
11 i = (buf >> (DIGIT_BIT − 1)) & 1; /∗ grab the next msb from the multiplicand ∗/
12 buf <<= 1;
13 if (mode == 0) {
14 mode = i; /∗ timing resistant − dummy operations ∗/
15 err = ecc_projective_add_point(M[1], M[2], M[2], a, modulus, mp);...
16 err = ecc_projective_dbl_point(M[2], M[3], a, modulus, mp);...
17 }...
18 err = ecc_projective_add_point(M[0], M[1], M[i^1], a, modulus, mp);...
19 err = ecc_projective_dbl_point(M[2], M[2], a, modulus, mp);...
20 } /∗ end for ∗/...}
Listing 1: wc_ecc_mulmod_ex implements scalar multiplica-
tion using a bit-by-bit always-add-and-double algorithm. The
function protects against both timing and cache attacks by ex-
ecuting dummy instructions. For brevity, error checking and
code sections that are not relevant to our attack are removed.
gcd(r,λ(N)) = 1. The private key then can be computed as
d = rb mod λ(N). In this proposal, it is even suggested that
r can be hard coded. We tested our attack for a hard coded
(known) choice of r and verified that key recovery works in
this case. Alternatively, if r is not hard coded but we have
a trace for the initial gcd(r,λ(N)) computation using binary
gcd, we can again decode it (with the knowledge of N) to
recover r. With r recovered, the attack proceeds as before, i.e.
from the execution trace of b = (er)−1 mod λ(N) we recover
p and q by running Algorithm 3 with er supplied as input
instead of e. Since Algorithm 3 is agnostic with respect to the
size of e, it will handle the full size er and recover p and q.
4.4 Breaking ECDSA Timing Protection
WolfSSL uses the subroutine wc_ecc_mulmod_ex (List-
ing 1) to compute the scalar multiplication k ×G while
generating the signature. This subroutine has built-in mit-
igations against side-channel attacks and implements an
always-add-and-double algorithm by arithmetizing the
conditional check for the add. As a result the scalar oper-
ations add at Line 15/18 and double at Line 16/19 will both
be executed for all scalar bits. This prevents an adversary
learning the nonce k bit by bit. The second countermeasure
that is implemented in this implementation aims to protect
against attacks exploiting the bit length of the nonce [16, 48].
This is done by executing a sequence of dummy operations
for each leading zero bit. While these dummy operations mit-
igate side channels like data cache attacks, page-level attacks,
and timing attacks, we can use COPYCAT to distinguish the
branch outcome at Line 13 and leak the bit length of nonce k.
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Table 2: Minimum number of signature samples for each bias
class to reach 100% recovery success for the lattice-based
key recovery on wc_ecc_mulmod_ex of ECDSA, with lattice
reduction time L-TIME and trace collection time T-TIME.
LZBS DIM L-TIME SIGNATURES IRQS T-TIME
4 75 30 sec 1,200 3.9M 13.3 sec
5 58 5 sec 1,856 6.0M 20.4 sec
6 46 3 sec 2,944 9.6M 33.7 sec
7 42 2 sec 5,376 17.5M 1 min
Recovering Dummy Operations. We analyze
wc_ecc_mulmod_ex using COPYCAT. In this analysis,
we count the number of instructions that are executed
between consecutive accesses to the page that holds the
ecc_projective_dbl_point subroutine. The trace shows
that for one transition of basic blocks, we can observe 49
steps when the function is processing the dummy operations.
As soon as the subroutine switches to the real operations, this
step count will change to 46. As a result, we can use this
information to determine the number of dummy executions
of the always-add-and-double sequence from a set of
traces. Since we only need to observe the first few bits in
order to recover the length of the nonce, we shortened our
trace collection to observe only the first 7 bits.
Lattice Attack using the Nonce Bit Length. We gener-
ated many signature traces, recovered the nonce lengths, and
filtered for signatures with short nonces [13]. We followed the
approach of Howgrave-Graham and Smart [33] and Benger
et al. [8] to formulate the key recovery as a lattice problem.
Evaluation. We executed this attack for 10,000 signing op-
erations. Our attack recovered the number of leading zero
bits with 100% accuracy. On average, each attack issues 3244
IRQs to count 2542 steps of the scalar multiplication opera-
tion. Table 2 shows the results for key recovery using various
nonce bit lengths. Since the nonce length is recovered without
noise, the lattice attack is quite efficient.
5 COPYCAT-Based Side-Channel Analysis
Now that we have empirically verified through real-world
attacks that COPYCAT can recover the runtime control flow
of all the branches deterministically, we analyze similar cryp-
tographic implementations in other open-source libraries in-
cluding the latest Libgcrypt 1.8.5, OpenSSL 1.1.1d, and Intel
IPP Crypto [35]. OpenSSL and Intel IPP Crypto are partic-
ularly important for products using Intel SGX. Intel has an
official wrapper around OpenSSL, called Intel SGX-SSL [37].
The current version of Intel SGX-SSL is based on the stable
OpenSSL 1.1.1d. Intel IPP Crypto is the official cryptographic
library by Intel, and it is deployed in many Intel products in-
Algorithm 4 Modular inversion using a variant of BEEA.
1: procedure MODINV(u, modulus v)
2: u1← 1,u2← 0,u3← u
3: v1← v,v2← u1−u,v3← v
4: if isOdd(u) then
5: t1← 0, t2←−1, t3←−v
6: else
7: t1← 1, t2← 0, t3← u
8: while t3 6= 0 do
9: while isEven(t3) do
10: if isOdd(t1) or isOdd(t2) then
11: t1← t1 + v, t2← t2−u
12: t1← t1/2, t2← t2/2, t3← t3/2
13: if t3 > 0 then
14: u1← t1,u2← t2,u3← t3
15: else
16: v1← v− t1,v2←−u− t2,v3←−t3
17: t1← u1− v1, t2← u2− v2, t3← u3− v3
18: if t1 < 0 then t1← t1 + v, t2← t2−u
return u1
cluding Intel SGX SDK [39]. Table 3 summarizes our findings
in this paper regarding vulnerable code paths.
5.1 Libgcrypt Analysis
Libgcrypt uses a custom implementation of the extended
Euclidean algorithm to compute modular inverses (Algo-
rithm 4). This algorithm is based on an exercise from The
Art of Computer Programming [43, Vol II, §4.5.2, Alg X].
The algorithm is an adaptation of Algorithm X to use the effi-
cient divide by 2 reduction steps in the Binary Euclidean
Algorithm. The algorithm computes a vector (u1,u2,u3)
such that uu1 + vu2 = u3 = gcd(u,v) using auxiliary vectors
(v1,v2,v3),(t1, t2, t3). The iterations preserve the invariants
ut1 + vt2 = t3, uu1 + vu2 = u3 and uv1 + vv2 = v3. This algo-
rithm is used in numerous places for secret operations.
k−1 mod n in DSA, ECDSA and ElGamal. The DSA,
ECDSA and ElGamal signature schemes all require com-
puting k−1 mod n. In Libgcrypt, all of these computations
are performed using Algorithm 4. We derive a single-trace
attack similar to Section 4.2 that recovers all the branches of
this algorithm during this computation. This trivially leaks
k−1 for each of these algorithms in a single-trace attack. As a
result, they are all vulnerable to the attack described in Sec-
tion 4.2. Note that no masking countermeasure is used for
DSA and ElGamal, and we discuss below how the masking
countermeasure for ECDSA is insecure.
ECDSA Masking Countermeasure. We identified two
vulnerabilities in how masking is applied during ECDSA
signing in Libgcrypt, as shown in Listing 2, which leaves it
vulnerable to attacks against Algorithm 4 and a single-trace at-
tack during the computation of k−1 mod n. Using a randomly
chosen blinding variable b, Libgcrypt computes the blinded
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Table 3: An overview of applicability of COPYCAT on cryptographic libraries: WolfSSL, Libgcrypt, OpenSSL, IPP Crypto.
Operation (Subroutine) Implementation SecretBranch Exploitable Computation→ Vulnerable Callers
Single-Trace
Attack
Scalar Multiply (wc_ecc_mulmod_ex) Montgomery Ladder w/ Branches 4 4 (k×G)→ wc_ecc_sign_hash 8
Greatest Common Divisor (fp_gcd) Euclidean (Divisions) 4 8 N/A N/A
(k−1 mod n)→ wc_DsaSign 4
(q−1 mod p)→ wc_MakeRsaKey 4Wo
lfSS
L
Modular Inverse (fp_invmod) BEEA 4 4
(e−1 mod Λ(N))→ wc_MakeRsaKey 4
Greatest Common Divisor (mpi_gcd) Euclidean (Divisions) 4 8 N/A N/A
(k−1 mod n)→ {dsa,elgamal}.c::sign,_gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign 4
(q−1 mod p)→ generate_{std,fips,x931} 4Libg
cry
pt
Modular Inverse (mpi_invm) Modified BEEA [43, Vol II, §4.5.2] 4 4
(e−1 mod Λ(N))→ generate_{std,fips,x931} 4
Greatest Common Divisor (BN_gcd) BEEA 4 4 gcd(q−1, p−1)→ RSA_X931_derive_ex 4
Op
enS
SL
Modular Inverse (BN_mod_inverse_no_branch) BEEA w/ Branches 8 N/A N/A N/A
? gcd(q−1,e)→ cpIsCoPrime N/A
Greatest Common Divisor (ippsGcd_BN) Modified Lehmer’s GCD 4 ? gcd(p−1,q−1)→ isValidPriv1_rsa N/A
IPP
Cry
pto
Modular Inverse (cpModInv_BNU) Euclidean (Divisions) 4 8 N/A N/A
signature as sb = k−1(hb+bdr) mod n. To compute the un-
blinded signature, it computes s = sbb−1 mod n. The first vul-
nerability is that k−1 mod n is not blinded, so a single-trace
attack on this operation simply recovers the nonce k. This
blinding should be modified to sb = (kb)−1(h+ xr) mod n,
and this can be unblinded by computing s = sbb mod n.
1 mpi_mulm (dr, b, skey−>d, skey−>E.n);
2 mpi_mulm (dr, dr, r, skey−>E.n); /∗ dr = d∗r mod n (blinded) ∗/
3 mpi_mulm (sum, b, hash, skey−>E.n);
4 mpi_addm (sum, sum, dr, skey−>E.n); /∗ sum = hash + (d∗r) mod n (blinded) ∗/
5 mpi_mulm (sum, bi, sum, skey−>E.n); /∗ undo blinding by b^−1 ∗/
6 mpi_invm (k_1, k, skey−>E.n); /∗ k_1 = k^(−1) mod n ∗/
7 mpi_mulm (s, k_1, sum, skey−>E.n); /∗ s = k^(−1)∗(hash+(d∗r)) mod n ∗/
Listing 2: The masking protection for ECDSA leaves the
k−1 mod n operation vulnerable to our single-trace attack.
The second vulnerability is that since b needs to be inverted
in this blinding scheme, Libgcrypt computes the b−1 mod n
using the same vulnerable implementation (Listing 3). There-
fore, a single-trace attack can also recover the blinding value.
1 do { _gcry_mpi_randomize (b, qbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
2 mpi_mod (b, b, skey−>E.n);
3 } while (!mpi_invm (bi, b, skey−>E.n));
Listing 3: _gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign computes the modular
inverse of the blinding factor b using a vulnerable function.
RSA InputMasking. To avoid timing attacks, RSA decryp-
tion and signing in Libgcrypt use masking on the input cipher-
text or message. For a random variable r and input cipher-
text c, the decryption is performed on mb = (cre)d mod n =
cdr mod n. The message can then be unblinded by computing
m = mbr−1 = cd mod n. Unfortunately, the r−1 mod n is also
computed using the vulnerable modular inverse function. As
a result, a single-trace attack can recover the blinding factor,
rendering this countermeasure ineffective.
RSA Key Generation. Three RSA key generation sub-
routines in Libgcrypt: generate_std, generate_fips and
generate_x931 all use the vulnerable mpi_invm function to
compute both q−1 mod p and e−1 mod λ(N), and are vulner-
able to the attacks described in Section 4.3.
1 if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa−>p, BN_value_one())) goto err; /∗ p−1 ∗/
2 if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa−>q, BN_value_one())) goto err; /∗ q−1 ∗/
3 if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) goto err; /∗ (p−1)(q−1) ∗/
4 if (!BN_gcd(r3, r1, r2, ctx)) goto err;
Listing 4: RSA_X931_derive_ex uses BN_gcd to compute
λ(N), exposing p and q to our attack.
5.2 Analysis of OpenSSL
After many iterations and multiple attacks [27, 75], OpenSSL
implemented a constant-time modular inversion function,
BN_mod_inverse_no_branch for DSA, ECDSA, and RSA
key generation. In various critical primitives, this function
is also used to compute the GCD. However the legacy bi-
nary GCD function is still supported in the latest OpenSSL
code base, version 1.1.1d, in the function BN_gcd (cf. Ap-
pendix Algorithm 5). The subroutine RSA_X931_derive_ex,
which is responsible for generating RSA keys according to the
X.931 standard, uses this function during the computation of
λ(N) = lcm(p−1,q−1) = (p−1)(q−1)/gcd(p−1,q−1),
as shown in Listing 4. Thus we can apply our attack tech-
nique from Section 4.3 to recover the RSA private key from
the computation of gcd(p−1,q−1).
5.3 Analysis of Intel IPP Crypto
The Intel IPP Crypto library uses a conventional Euclidean
algorithm to compute modular inverses. This algorithm per-
forms a series of division operations in a loop. While COPY-
CAT can recover the precise number of division operations,
this leakage does not seem to be exploitable during the RSA
key generation [48, §6].
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On the other hand, for computing the GCD, Intel IPP
Crypto uses a modified version of Lehmer’s GCD algo-
rithm [63]. Lehmer’s GCD algorithm and Intel’s modified im-
plementation are not constant time, and have secret-dependent
branches [36]. This GCD implementation is only used dur-
ing RSA key generation, where only a single-trace attack
results in a vulnerability. Our analysis in Section 4.3 does
not directly apply to this algorithm, and we leave the analysis
and potential exploitability of this implementation for future
work. This potential oversight in Intel’s GCD implementation
once more illustrates the intricacies of applying Intel’s own
recommended constant-time programming guidelines [41].
5.4 More Single-Trace Attack Evaluations
Attack on DSA, ECDSA and ElGamal (Libgcrypt). We
replicated the attack in Section 4.2 using synthetic traces
from Algorithm 4. We ran the attack on 100 different k−1 mod
n and recovered kinv and the secret key in all cases. The attack
applies to ElGamal as well by computing the private key
x = r−1(h− sk) mod (p−1).
Attack on RSA Key Generation (Libgcrypt, OpenSSL).
We replicated synthetic traces of branches from OpenSSL’s
binary GCD algorithm executed on gcd(q−1, p−1). We ap-
plied Algorithm 2 with a modified test function modeling this
algorithm, and applied a heuristic to match the appropriate
number of trace steps to the bits guessed so far. We ran the at-
tack using synthetic traces for 100 different 256-bit RSA keys.
This key size is chosen to efficiently verify the correctness of
our algorithm. Our attack successfully recovered every key.
We similarly replicated the same attack as Section 4.3 with
a test function following Algorithm 4. Similarly, we ran the
attack using synthetic traces for 100 different 256-bit RSA
keys and the attack was successful in all cases.
6 Limitations and Future Work
Vulnerable Code Patterns. COPYCAT interrupts a victim
enclave precisely one instruction at a time and relies on a
secondary page-table oracle to assign a spatial resolution to
each instruction-granular observation. Our attack is thus only
effective when the victim code contains a secret-dependent
branch that accesses a different code or data page at the same
instruction offset in both execution paths. In contrast to pre-
vious controlled-channel attacks [61, 72, 80], our notion of
instruction-granular page access traces allows the sequence
of code and data page visits in both branches to be identical.
We essentially only need a “marker” page that is accessed
at a different relative instruction offset in the secret-dependent
execution path. We found that in practice compilers gener-
ate code with different page accesses at different instruction
offsets in both branches for a variety of reasons, including
data or stack accesses, arithmetic operations, and subroutine
calls. The evaluation of the previous sections clearly shows
that the instruction-granular page access traces extracted by
COPYCAT are strictly stronger, and can hence target more vul-
nerable code patterns, than the page fault sequences exploited
by prior controlled-channel attacks. In order to not be vulnera-
ble to COPYCAT, secret-dependent code paths should ideally
be avoided altogether, or they should be explicitly aligned in
such a way that both branches always access the exact same
set of code and data pages for every instruction among both
execution paths.
Automation Opportunities. The case-study attacks pre-
sented in this paper relied on careful manual inspection of
the victim enclave source code and binary layout to iden-
tify vulnerable secret-dependent code patterns. We expect
that dynamic analysis and symbolic execution approaches
could further improve the effectiveness of our attacks, and
increase confidence for defenders, by automating the discov-
ery of vulnerable code patterns [73, 76] and possibly even the
synthesis of proof-of-concept exploitation code. While the
requirements for vulnerable code patterns are relatively clear-
cut, as described above, we expect that it may be particularly
challenging to automatically track the propagation of secrets
and distinguish between non-secret and secret-dependent con-
trol flows [11].
Comparison to Branch Prediction Leakage. Table 1
identified branch prediction side channels [24, 34, 44] as
an alternative attack vector to spy on enclave control flow at
an instruction-level granularity with reasonable accuracy. In
contrast to COPYCAT, however, microarchitectural leakage
from branch predictors is inherently noisy and typically re-
quires multiple runs of the victim enclave, ruling out this class
of side channels for the noiseless single-trace attacks on key
generation algorithms presented in this paper. Furthermore,
in contrast to the architectural interrupt and paging interfaces
exploited by COPYCAT, branch prediction side-channel leak-
age can be eradicated relatively straightforwardly by flushing
branch history buffers when exiting the enclave, similar to the
microcode updates Intel already distributed to flush branch
predictors on enclave entry in response to Spectre threats [19].
In addition to being deterministic, our attack is significantly
easier to scale and replicate, considering that branch predic-
tors feature a complex design that may change from one mi-
croarchitecture to the other. BranchScope [24], for instance,
relies on finding a heuristic through reverse engineering to
probe a specific branch. This heuristic is dependent on (i) the
state of other components like global and tournament predic-
tors; and (ii) the exact binary layout of the victim program.
Previous attacks focus on distinguishing one or a small num-
ber of branches and we believe that replicating BranchScope
to probe multiple branches across various targets (e.g., BEEA)
would be challenging and may even be practically infeasible.
COPYCAT, in contrast, is much easier to replicate, and we
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showed in Section 4 that our attack scales to probing the entire
execution path in a single run.
7 Mitigation Strategies
Interrupt Detection. COPYCAT relies on the ability to
single-step enclaved execution, which is within Intel SGX’s
threat model [40, 70]. While SGX enclaves remain explicitly
interrupt-unaware by design, some research proposals [21, 60]
retrofit hardware support for transactional memory to detect
suspicious interrupt rates as a side-effect of an ongoing attack.
However, such features are not commonly available on off-
the-shelf SGX hardware, and they would not fundamentally
address the attack surface as COPYCAT adversaries are likely
to develop stealthier attack techniques [72, 74] that remain
under the radar of heuristic defenses. Nevertheless, following
a long line of microarchitectural attacks [34, 44, 47, 70, 71]
abusing interrupts, our study provides strong evidence that
interrupts may also amplify deterministic controlled-channel
leakage and should be taken into account in the enclaved exe-
cution threat model. We advocate for architectural changes in
the Intel SGX design and further research to rule out interrupt-
driven attack surface [17].
Self-Paging. Recent work [50] proposes modifications to
the Intel SGX architecture to rule out page-fault controlled
channels by delegating paging decisions to the enclave. The
proposed design modifies the processor to no longer report
the faulting page base address to the untrusted OS and to not
update “accessed” and “dirty” page-table attributes when in
enclave mode. While these modifications would indeed thwart
the deterministic spatial dimension of the COPYCAT instan-
tiations described in this paper, we expect that adversaries
may adapt by resorting to alternative side-channel oracles to
construct instruction-granular page access patterns. A partic-
ularly promising avenue in this respect would be to combine
COPYCAT interrupt counting with the distinct timing differ-
ences observed for unprotected page-table entries that were
brought into the CPU cache during enclaved execution [72].
Static Code Balancing. We encourage future research in
improved compile-time hardening techniques that may au-
tomatically rewrite conditional branches to always ensure a
constant interrupt counting pattern, regardless of the executed
code. The key requirement for such a defense would be to en-
sure that the adversary not only observes a secret-independent
sequence of pages but also always counts the same number
of instructions between page transitions. To achieve such a
guarantee, the compiler would also have to be explicitly aware
of macro fusion, as explained in Section 3.1, when balancing
the observed instruction counts. We expect further challenges
when dealing with secret-dependent loop bounds, as in our
attacks of Section 4. To handle data accesses, control-flow
balancing techniques could potentially be combined with ex-
isting solutions for data location randomization [14].
Constant-Time Implementation. The best practice for
cryptographic implementations is to avoid secret-dependent
branches and memory lookups. WolfSSL applied such a coun-
termeasure to mitigate our attack on ECDSA (CVE-2019-
19960). Bernstein and Yang proposed a constant-time GCD
algorithm that can be used for applications like modular inver-
sion [10]. However, constant-time implementations are not
easy for generic non-cryptographic applications [64]. While
there are tools and techniques to test [76], verify [6], and gen-
erate [12] constant-time code, the scalability and performance
of these approaches is still far from settled.
Cryptographic Countermeasures. While it is preferable
to avoid secret-dependent branches altogether, specific coun-
termeasures can be applied to some cryptographic schemes.
As we discuss in Section 5, masking the input of the mod-
ular inversion can mitigate our demonstrated attack if it is
applied properly and the blinding value itself is not leaked.
WolfSSL applies this solution to mitigate our attack on DSA
(CVE-2019-19963). However, as we showed in Section 5
and Section 4.3, these countermeasures should be applied
carefully in the presence of a powerful adversary.
Some operations have more secure alternative implemen-
tations. In particular, for the attack on q−1 mod p RSA-CRT
key generation (CVE-2020-7960), Fermat’s Little Theorem
computes qp−2 mod p. As a result, the implementation can
avoid modular inversion for this operation, and instead rely
on a constant-time modular exponentiation implementation.
8 Conclusion
Our works show that deterministic controlled-channel adver-
saries are not restricted to observing enclave memory ac-
cesses at the level of coarse-grained 4 KiB pages, but can also
precisely reconstruct intra-page control flow at a maximal,
instruction-level granularity. We demonstrated the practical-
ity and improved resolution of COPYCAT by discovering
highly dangerous single-trace key extraction attacks in sev-
eral real-world, side-channel hardened cryptographic libraries.
In contrast to known microarchitectural leakage sources, the
more fundamental threat of deterministic controlled-channel
leakage cannot be dealt with by merely flushing or partition-
ing microarchitectural state and instead requires research into
more principled solutions.
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A Appendix
A.1 OpenSSL GCD Algorithm
Algorithm 5 shows the binary GCD algorithm in OpenSSL.
Algorithm 5 OpenSSL Binary GCD Algorithm.
1: procedure GCD(a, b)
2: s← 0
3: if a < b then a,b← b,a
4: while b 6= 0 do
5: if isOdd(a) then
6: if isOdd(b) then . a is odd, b is odd
7: a← a−b,a← a/2
8: if a < b then a,b← b,a
9: else . a is odd, b is even
10: b← b/2
11: if a < b then a,b← b,a
12: else
13: if isOdd(b) then . a is even, b is odd
14: a← a/2
15: if a < b then a,b← b,a
16: else . a is even, b is even
17: a← a/2,b← b/2,s← s+1
18: if s > 0 then a← a∗ (2s)
19: return a
A.2 Branch Shadow-Resistant Code Attack
Listing 5 provides an elementary example function with
secret-dependent branches. We provide the corresponding
assembly output in Listing 6, as produced by the LLVM-
based, open-source compiler mitigation pass [32] against
branch shadowing attacks, described in Section 3.3. We
passed the -mllvm -x86-branch-conversion and -mllvm
-x86-bc-dummy-instr options to enable both rewriting of
conditional branches via the trampoline area and protection
against timing attacks via dummy instruction balancing. Note
that the randomizer is not integrated in the open-source re-
lease, and all code blocks on the trampoline area would still
have to be randomly re-shuffled at runtime to protect against
branch-shadowing attacks. To achieve sufficient entropy, tram-
poline areas have to be larger than 4 KiB [32], and hence the
trampoline will occupy at least one separate page.
We reveal control flow in the instrumented code of List-
ing 6 using COPYCAT as follows. In the case where the
secret-dependent if condition is true, the indirect branch at
line 20 will execute the single-instruction jmp_if block on
the trampoline page, followed by 4 instructions on the instru-
mented code page, totaling 5 instructions before reaching the
end_if marker. In contrast, if the if condition is false, the in-
direct branch at line 20 will transfer to the skip_if block on
the trampoline page, totaling 4 instructions before eventually
reaching the end_if marker back on the instrumented code
void my_func(int a) {
if (a != 0) block1++; else block2++;
block3++;
}
Listing 5: Sample code snippet with conditional branching.
1 jmp my_func /*** BEGIN TRAMPOLINE ***/
2 jmp_done: jmp done
3 jmp_done2:jmp done
4 skip_else:add $0x0,%r13b # compensating dummy
5 lea jmp_done2(%rip),%r15
6 jmp end_else
7 jmp_else: jmp else
8 skip_if: add $0x0,%r13b # compensating dummy
9 add $0x0,%r13b # compensating dummy
10 lea jmp_else(%rip),%r15
11 jmp end_if
12 jmp_if: jmp if /*** END TRAMPOLINE ***/
13 my_func: push %rbp
14 mov %rsp,%rbp
15 mov %edi,-0x4(%rbp)
16 cmpl $0x0,-0x4(%rbp)
17 lea jmp_if(%rip),%r15
18 lea skip_if(%rip),%r13
19 cmove %r13,%r15
20 jmp *%r15
21 if: mov block1(%rip),%eax
22 add $0x1,%eax
23 mov %eax,block1(%rip)
24 lea skip_else(%rip),%r15
25 end_if: jmp *%r15
26 else: mov block2(%rip),%eax
27 add $0x1,%eax
28 mov %eax,block2(%rip)
29 lea jmp_done(%rip),%r15
30 end_else: jmp *%r15
31 done: mov block3(%rip),%eax
32 add $0x1,%eax
33 mov %eax,block3(%rip)
34 pop %rbp
35 ret
Listing 6: Hardened assembly output, corresponding to the
source code in Listing 5, as produced by the open-source
branch shadowing mitigation LLVM compiler pass.
page. Similar unbalanced instruction counts follow for the
else block.
We experimentally verified that COPYCAT adversaries can
deterministically learn the if condition by merely counting
instructions and observing page accesses. Moreover, because
the dummy instructions do not result in exactly balanced
instruction counts, as explained above, merely counting the
total amount of executed instructions even suffices in itself
without having to distinguish accesses to the trampoline page.
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